Setting prices for elective patient treatments in private for-profit (PFP) hospitals in traditional tax-funded health systems is challenging since both the organisation of these hospitals and the tasks they perform differ considerably from what we find in public hospitals. From the year 2000, Norway became one of a few countries to gradually implement a procurement system based on competitive tendering when outsourcing elective surgery. In this study we analyse the effect of introducing competitive tendering on the prices paid to PFP hospitals. Pricing data were collected from the formal contracts awarded to PFP hospitals and defined in terms of both absolute and relative prices. We found that PFP hospitals performed day surgeries at markedly lower prices than public hospitals and that competitive tendering triggered the price reduction. We speculate that the PFP hospitals' lack of acute services, less severe patient population, reduced teaching responsibilities and ability to streamline production, as well as other factors, explain the lower prices at PFP hospitals. 
Introduction
Outsourcing public service provision, the outcome of which can easily be measured and monitored, has become commonplace in most industrialised countries. More recently, outsourcing has expanded from traditionally non-core public services such as cleaning and refuse collection to include core services and more high-risk and complex tasks (Young 2007, Jensen and Stonecash 2005) . In the healthcare sector, outsourcing has been extended from non-core services to include clinical services such as laboratory and diagnostic services, as well as elective surgery (Augurzky and Scheuer 2007 , André and Hermann 2008 , Hofer and Rohrer 2011 , Guimarães and de Carvalho 2011 , Macinati 2008 , Barros and Monteiro 2016 . In parallel to the outsourcing of elective treatment, patients in countries such as the UK, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Australia and New Zealand may opt out of public hospitals and receive elective treatment at private clinics with costs covered by a public purchaser.
This allows the government to quickly access additional capacity (Mason et al. 2009 , Vrangbaek and Ostergren 2006 , Siciliani and Hurst 2005 .
To our knowledge, only a few countries, including Norway and Denmark, organise the procurement process between public purchasers and private for-profit (PFP) hospitals by means of competitive tendering. We do not know of any existing analyses that reveal the effects of such processes. In this paper, we evaluate the effects of the Norwegian procurement processes that have been in use since 2000 and that, at the start of this period, also included low-powered incentives such as negotiation and negotiation with price information. The standard prediction from economic theory is that competitive tendering and selective contracting will result in reduced prices but also increased patient selection and possible problems with quality F o r P e e r R e v i e w 4 (Laffont and Tirole 1988 , 1990 , Ellis 1998 . In this analysis, we concentrate on the effects on absolute and relative prices paid to PFP hospitals where relative prices are generated from comparisons with the Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG) prices used to determine funding for public hospitals. Our data covers the period 2002-2011. We address two research questions: 1) What is the effect on prices paid to private forprofit hospitals of switching from low-powered incentive systems to high-powered open tendering systems? 2) What are the price differences between private, for-profit hospitals and public hospitals at the end of the study period?
International evidence shows a wide consensus on possible cost savings from contracting out non-core public services such as cleaning, road maintenance and refuse collection. However, there is disagreement on the magnitude, sources and sustainability of such savings, and studies on their impact on quality are inconclusive (Domberger and Jensen 1997 , Jensen and Stonecash 2005 , Milne and Wright 2004 .
According to a recent review by Petersen et al. (2012) , there is little evidence that outsourcing leads to cost savings in core public services such as eldercare, nursing, childcare, education and employment. Evidence of the impact of outsourcing clinical services is scarce probably because its outcomes cannot be easily measured and monitored. One paper that reviews both theory and evidence addresses the benefits and risks of District Health Boards outsourcing elective procedures to private providers in New Zealand (Ashton 2010 ). According to this study, the potential benefits of outsourcing elective surgical procedures to private providers include an increased number of patients treated, reduced public hospital waiting times, reduced prices, improved utilisation of existing spare capacity and greater collaboration between the public and private sectors. Risks include higher transaction costs, increased inequality across population groups, and increased problems with F o r P e e r R e v i e w 5 recruitment and retention of health professionals in the public sector. Empirical evidence from the UK supports that outsourcing in the health care sector may increase selection problems (Chard et al. 2011 , Mason, Street, and Verzulli 2010 ).
In Norway, outsourcing of elective treatment to PFP hospitals has been facilitated by several reforms, including the introduction of activity-based funding in 1997. Before presenting the data, methods, and results of our study, we provide a description of these reforms.
Institutional setting
Three major changes in the Norwegian secondary care services have shaped the organisation of elective surgery in Norway, namely, the introduction of activity- The Norwegian health care system is predominantly based on tax-financed public provision and delivers universal access to healthcare services (Ringard et al. 2013 ). The reimbursement scheme for somatic hospitals changed in 1997 from a system of risk-adjusted global budgets to a combination of ABF and global budgets (Hagen and Kaarbøe 2006) . Activity-based funding of somatic hospital services is based on the DRG system. Since its implementation, the share of ABF versus the corresponding block grants has changed frequently and has varied from 30 per cent in 1997 to 60 per cent in 2003 and 2005. As of 2016, the share of ABF is 50 per cent.
The introduction of ABF aimed at providing incentives for hospitals to reduce waiting lists, especially long waiting times for elective treatment (Hagen and Kaarbøe 2006) . DRG-based payment was implemented in 2000 for PFPs that had institutions from the county governments and 2) hospitals were organised into health enterprises. The coordination and steering responsibility for these changes was given to five (later reduced to four) regional health authorities (RHAs). This reform was aimed at addressing some of the problems in the Norwegian health care system at that time, which included long waiting lists for elective surgery, lack of equality in the supply of hospital services and lack of financial responsibility (Hagen and amendments gave the patient the right to receive necessary and adequate treatment within a legislated time limit and the right to be transferred to a private provider or foreign healthcare provider if the waiting time guarantee was breached (Magnussen et al. 2009, Vrangbaek and Ostergren 2006) . Further changes to the legislation were Both the introduction of ABF and the Patients' Rights Act allowed counties, and later the RHAs, to look beyond the public hospitals to provide treatment to their catchment area population and to reduce the waiting lists and waiting times for hospital-based care, particularly for elective treatments. The use of PFP providers was considered as a possible solution to capacity problems (Magnussen et al. 2009 ). Laffont and Tirole (1993) summarise the literature on procurement processes and contracts and distinguish between incentive contracts with varying power. Our data cover three types of procurement processes, namely negotiation, negotiation based on informal price information and competitive tendering, with the latter being by far the most powerful of the three. The main idea behind tendering is that the problem of information asymmetry and moral hazard between a purchaser and possible providers can be overcome by inviting more providers to bid on a certain contract.
Theoretical background, data, and methods

Procurement processes
Since the agents are assumed to have a preference for being awarded the contract, they will have an incentive to reduce costs and to report their true costs to the purchaser. Even with few bidders, competitive tendering will lead to a situation in which the true costs of the providers will be revealed and the costs to the purchaser for acquiring a specific service can be reduced. In our case, we propose that the introduction of competitive tendering with selective contracts led to lower prices than the other procurement processes (negotiation and negotiation based on price Health Problems (ICD) code which is specified in the contracts (Kobel et al. 2011 ).
The coding was done by a physician with comprehensive coding experience. By the end of 2011, only a minority of contracts were based on procedures. However, this changed after our data collection ended. All RHAs now base the contracts on price per procedure.
We defined the prices in two ways -as absolute prices (AbsP it ) and as the percentage of the comparable DRG prices used at public hospitals, i.e., as relative prices, RelP it = (AbsP it / (U t × W it )) × 100, where AbsP it is the absolute price expressed in NOK in the contract for each DRG i in a year t; U t is the unit price from the DRG system set by the central government each year; and W it is the DRG weight for each DRG calculated every year. Absolute prices were adjusted for inflation using the consumer price index (2011=1). Data on unit prices and DRG weights were In the present study we analyse prices for day surgery exclusively, which made up approximately 90 per cent of the activity in PFP hospitals funded by public purchasers and could be classified by the DRG system during the study period (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) . In the latter part of this period, there was an expansion of medical day treatment as well as outpatient consultations, which we excluded. PFP hospitals also provide treatment paid out-of-pocket or by private insurance. The share of privately funded private health services is probably increasing, but since data on this activity are not systematically reported to the Norwegian Patient Register, the volume is currently unknown (2016). Information about regulatory regimes was collected via interviews at the RHA level during the analysis period. Interviews were conducted every year when new contracts were established or old ones were renegotiated.
In addition to the above-mentioned data, which are used in the analyses, we present descriptive analyses of the volume of day surgery based on information from the Norwegian Patient Register.
1 https://helsedirektoratet.no/publikasjoner/innsatsstyrt-finansiering-regelverk F o r P e e r R e v i e w
Statistical model
We estimated several statistical models, including the following, which is the most comprehensive:
Eq. (1) where the dependent variables are absolute (AbsP it ) or relative prices (RelP it ). T, the variable describing the procurement process, is coded 1 for competitive tendering and 0 for other procurement processes (negotiation or negotiation with price information) ( Table 1 ). T varies depending on the RHA (r) and the year (t).
Differences in case mix represent a major challenge in our study. We included fixed effects for DRGs and RHAs, which gave us ability to control for unobserved heterogeneity and analyse the effects of the procurement processes within each RHA and DRG. However, fixed effects will not fully account for the case mix problem, a point to which we will return in the discussion.
A major change was implemented in the DRG system beginning in 2010 when the DRG weights for surgeries in public hospitals were split between inpatient stays and day surgical stays. To control for this diversification, we included a dummy variable, DY, taking the value of 1 for 2010 and 2011 and 0 for earlier years.
We estimate different versions of the model described by Eq. (1). In the full model we primarily concentrate on whether introducing tendering had an effect on the absolute and relative prices paid to PFP hospitals. In sensitivity analyses we run slightly different versions of the full model as will be presented. We were not able to establish the number of bidders for each contract, which would indicate the degree of We also ran a cross-section model with data from 2010 and 2011 to compare prices between PFP hospitals and public hospitals at the end of our study period.
Price comparison between PFP hospitals and public hospitals is more relevant for data from these years since we then compare prices within day surgical DRGs between the two types of hospitals. However, case mix problems cannot be fully ruled out in this case either; we will elaborate on this in the discussion.
Results
Descriptive statistics
From 2002 During the last part of our study period, the trends were less clear.
<Table 4 here>
Regression results
An initial Hausman test preferred a fixed effect model to a random coefficient model.
In our simplest fixed effect model ( The analyses of relative prices (RelP) offered similar results with the effects of competitive tendering being -14 per cent (p<0.001) compared with negotiation or negotiation with price information. Price differences between RHAs were significant. R 2 was lower than in the models where we analysed absolute prices.
The cross-section analysis of data from 2010 and 2011 made it possible to analyse price differences between public hospitals and PFP hospitals since we compared day surgical DRGs in both types of hospital. The point estimate of the difference was 26 percentage points (not shown in tables). For 2011 we do also have access to individual data that makes it possible to compare the case mix within each DRG across the hospital types. Random spot checks of the most used DRGs indicated some variation in procedures between the two hospital types. Since prices at procedure level are unavailable from public hospitals, a more careful analysis of the price differences is not possible. We will return to this in the discussion. 
Discussion
We have analysed the price effects of outsourcing day surgical treatment to PFP hospitals in Norway. Our main result was that replacing negotiation with a model based on competitive tendering reduced prices paid by the RHAs to the PFP hospitals by around 14 per cent. To our knowledge, no other studies have analysed the effects of introducing competitive tendering in the provision of clinical healthcare services. Another finding was related to price differences between public hospitals and PFP hospitals for day surgery following the tendering period. The analyses indicated that prices in PFP hospitals were on average 26 per cent points lower than in public hospitals in 2010-2011, the last years in our study period. This result is comparable to those of a recent French study which found that, after adjustment for patient characteristics, admission to a PFP hospital was associated with significantly lower (up to 35 per cent) reimbursement rates for 9 out of 10 surgical procedures (Weeks, Jardin, and Paraponaris 2015) .
A third conclusion was that using PFP hospitals seems consistent with international empirical evidence that the choice to outsource decision-making is influenced by political ideology (Macinati 2008, Elinder and Jordahl 2013) and power (Bisman 2008 , Young 2007 . Following the switch to a centre-left government in autumn 2005, the activity in PFP hospitals was scaled back significantly.
That the use of competitive tendering reduced prices paid to private for-profit hospitals must be seen in light of the increase in the number of PFP hospitals in the first part of the period. While we do not know the exact number of bidders for each contract, we are confident that the number of bidders was higher in urban areas than elsewhere. That prices in general were lower in the South-Eastern RHA compared to the rest of the country was probably an indication of these differences in competitive situation.
There are a number of explanations why PFP hospitals can provide services at lower prices than public hospitals. These require further investigation. First, Norwegian PFP hospitals do not have acute services but concentrate instead on elective treatments. This business strategy affects costs and prices in at least two ways: expenses related to the rotation system (in particular the high costs to public hospitals of night and weekend shifts) can be reduced; and the treatment process can be streamlined and specialised. In many ways, the organisation of PFP hospitals has parallels to the 'ring-fenced' units found in some high-volume public hospitals where some surgical units are set aside for elective treatments. Ring-fenced units may increase cost efficiency because acute cases do not interrupt production and lead to cancellations in the surgical programme and because standardisation allows the hospital to differentiate and better adapt surgical equipment and routines to handle less complicated surgery with less effort (Kjekshus and Hagen 2005) . In Norwegian PFP hospitals, not only are single units shielded from interruptions from acute admissions, the whole hospital is.
Second, and closely related to the standardisation of treatments, there are scale effects. There is little evidence in the literature of an association between hospital volume and lower average patient costs (Posnett 1999) . However, Ho and Aloia (2008) examined the relationship between patient costs and both hospital volume and surgeon volume for six cancer surgery resections. They found that patient costs were lower at high-volume hospitals compared with low-volume hospitals for only one of the six procedures; conversely, high surgeon volume was associated with lower patient costs for all six procedures. This may also be the case for Norwegian PFP hospitals; they may not have the highest hospital volume, but the relatively few surgeons at each hospital may handle a relatively high number of patients. cases. In addition, theoretical courses totalling 200-300 hours are mandatory (Johannessen and Hagen 2013) . Indirect effects on cost may result from the fact that trainees commit significantly more errors due to lack of technical competence or knowledge than do their non-trainee counterparts, and trainee errors are more complex than non-trainee errors (Singh et al. 2007 ). Gawande et al. (2003) reported that the most commonly cited system factor contributing to errors at the three teaching hospitals studied was inexperience or lack of competence in a surgical task.
Fourth, PFP hospitals may hire doctors as independent contractors, both doctors engaged full time and those working part-time, many of whom are otherwise employed at public or private non-profit hospitals (Askildsen and Holmås 2013) . For such contracts, PFP hospitals are not required to pay payroll tax according to Norwegian tax law. Moreover, they can easily scale up or down their use of these doctors, thus limiting the amount of downtime.
The methodological challenge has been to adjust for variations in case mix.
Our empirical strategy has been to use fixed-effects analyses and compare prices within DRGs and RHAs over time. Fixed-effects analyses do not, however, fully If the DRGs have internal case or procedure mixes that differ systematically between PFP hospitals and public hospitals, the estimations of the price differences between the two types of hospitals will be biased.
Should treatments be shifted towards an increase in PFP hospitals?
Obviously, our results are only valid for certain clearly defined surgical procedures
and cannot be generalised to other procedures and patient groups without analysing a broader set of data. Another concern is that potential medical errors and complications at PFP hospitals will often be treated in public hospitals, which have longer opening hours and emergency departments, both lacking in PFP hospitals. A third concern is that shifting activity to PFP hospitals may leave public hospitals with Although there are uncertainties related to both the magnitude of the effects of introducing competitive tendering and the price differences between PFP hospitals and public hospitals, we argue that the mechanism of competitive tendering offers a solution to the concern raised by Mason et al. (2009) that a prospective payment system that offers a price per case that is equal for public hospitals and PFP hospitals may overfund the latter group.
The main limitation of our study was that we lacked many contracts for 2002, the year following the hospital reform. The missing contracts were primarily those that the Eastern Norway RHA inherited from Akershus County, one of the former hospital owners. According to informal information from that county, the prices paid were around 85 per cent of the national DRG price. If this was the case, we have underestimated the effects of tendering in our analyses.
Further studies should include analyses of the effects of using high-powered incentives on patient selection and quality of care. F o r P e e r R e v i e w 
